The Judges' Book
Volume 3

Article 14

2019

International Law: Explaining International Acts
Chimène I. Keitner

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/judgesbook
Part of the International Law Commons, and the Judges Commons
Recommended Citation
Keitner, Chimène I. (2019) "International Law: Explaining International Acts," The Judges' Book: Vol. 3 , Article 14.
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/judgesbook/vol3/iss1/14

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Judges' Book
by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

2019]

The Judges’ Book

87

International Law:
Explaining International Acts1
Chimène I. Keitner
In international law as in domestic law, the why of State action
matters, not just the what of State action. The “culture of justification”
that exists at the international level includes an expectation that States
will articulate the legal and policy bases for their actions, particularly
when such actions depart from accepted norms of State behavior.2 In a
variety of contexts, States are expected—and seek—to explain their
international acts.
Although deliberative processes that lead to international acts may
not be judicially reviewable to the same extent as those that lead to
purely domestic acts, the push for transparency among domestic
constituencies, as well as other oversight mechanisms, create ex ante
incentives for integrity in decision-making processes and rationales in
the conduct of foreign affairs. In addition, ex post explanations of
international acts may themselves carry legal significance as
expressions of a State’s opinio juris, or sense of legal obligation.
Scholars and practitioners should not discount the culture of
justification that exists at the international level, even outside
international courts and tribunals.
Forms and Functions of International Legal Justification
International legal rules can create, shape, and constrain policy
options in the conduct of foreign affairs. In government as in the
private sector, policy clients want to understand what the rules are, why
and how they apply, and what courses of conduct are legally available.
They may also seek to identify opportunities to shape the legal
environment in which they operate, in order to maximize the material
and nonmaterial benefits enjoyed by stakeholders. Articulating public

1. Summarized and excerpted from Chimène I. Keitner, Explaining
International Acts, 63 MCGILL L.J. 1 (2018). The author served as Counselor
on International Law in the U.S. Department of State in 2016-2017. This
article was written after she left that position and does not necessarily reflect
the views of the U.S. government.
2. Étienne Mureinik, A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of
Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 31 (1994) (introducing the term “culture of
justification”).
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justifications for their international acts enables States to shape the
understandings and expectations of other actors in the international
legal system.
Foreign ministry legal advisers act as intermediaries between the
domestic and international legal realms by translating international law
for domestic decisionmakers, and by conveying a State’s international
legal positions to foreign counterparts. Internally, foreign ministry
legal advisers identify what actions a State can take consistent with its
international (and, at times, domestic) legal obligations. Certain
actions may be, in the words of former U.S. State Department Legal
Adviser Harold Koh, “lawful but awful.”3 Others fall squarely within
the range of legally available options, and legal advisers can help
policy clients map out the potential implications and repercussions of
different approaches. Yet other actions may, in rare circumstances, be
deemed “illegal but legitimate,”4 such as the NATO air campaign in
Kosovo in the spring of 1999. The legal reasoning underpinning this ex
ante advice is generally shielded from public view, at least at the time it
is issued, to promote comprehensiveness and candor.
Publicly articulating the international legal rationales that underpin
a State’s actions may serve a variety of functions, in addition to
clarifying and crystallizing the rules of customary international law,
which are formed by nearly uniform state practice accompanied by a
sense of legal obligation. U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root, who was
later awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for his work on international
arbitration, posited in 1907 that “[t]he more clearly and universally the
people of a country realize the international duties and obligations of
their country, the less likely they will be to resent the just demands of
other countries that those obligations and duties be observed.”5
U.S. State Department Legal Advisers have long engaged in “legal
diplomacy” with U.S. partners, and have also endeavored to explain the
international legal framework governing U.S. actions to a wider
audience. For example, in 2016, State Department Legal Adviser Brian
Egan stated that “[l]egal diplomacy builds on common understandings
of international law, while also seeking to bridge or manage the
specific differences in any particular State’s international obligations or
3. Harold Hongju Koh, The State Department Legal Adviser’s Office:
Eight Decades in Peace and War, 100 GEO. L.J. 1747, 1758 (2012).
4. THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE
KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 4
(2000).
5. Elihu Root, The Need of Popular Understanding of International Law,
1 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (1907).
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interpretations.”6 Egan emphasized that “[e]ven if other governments
or populations do not agree with our precise legal theories or
conclusions, we must be able to demonstrate to others that our most
consequential national security and foreign policy decisions are guided
by a principled understanding and application of international law.”7
In the United States, the role of setting forth such explanations
often falls to the State Department Legal Adviser, whose ability to
speak authoritatively on behalf of the U.S. Government is buttressed by
his or her status as a Senate-confirmed official. Although the task of
public explanation may fall to different officials in different countries,
States routinely use legal terms to describe their own actions and
characterize other States’ behavior. Even if some of this “international
law talk” is strategic, reference to international law has become
embedded in States’ decisionmaking and shapes their assessment of
legally available courses of conduct, whether or not that conduct is
judicially reviewable.
States’ practice of justification extends beyond foreign ministries.
Government lawyers across agencies may also coordinate directly
regarding their respective legal interpretations and craft public
communications setting forth shared legal views. International law thus
not only shapes—and is shaped by—interactions and negotiations
among States, but also by interactions and negotiations among different
agencies within States, each with its own institutional culture, equities,
perspective, and personnel. Although such interactions are more likely
to characterize deliberations in liberal democracies than authoritarian
States, they illustrate a convergence between domestic and international
decisionmaking processes, and the role of law in each, across a range of
issue-areas.
Justifying Uses of Force
When a State engages in acts that are not self-evidently
reconcilable with accepted international legal rules, that State has three
basic options with regard to public explanation: (1) offering a legal
rationale and attempting to persuade relevant audiences that its actions
can be accommodated within existing legal rules, or that the legal rules
should be modified; (2) offering a policy rationale, while attempting to

6. Brian Egan, International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the CounterISIL Campaign: Some Observations, 92 INT’L L. STUD. 235, 244 (2016).
7. Id. at 247.
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preserve the integrity and binding force of potentially conflicting legal
rules; and (3) remaining silent.
By way of illustration, the United Kingdom and the United States
adopted different approaches in justifying their respective participation
in the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo in 1999. The United
Kingdom chose the first option, embracing humanitarian intervention
as internationally lawful in certain circumstances, even absent Security
Council authorization. The United States, by contrast, chose the second
option. As Acting Legal Adviser Michael Matheson explained, “[t]here
was broad consensus within NATO that armed action was required to
deal with intolerable atrocities by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY) in Kosovo, but also a shared concern that the chosen
justification not weaken international legal constraints on the use of
force.”8 As a result, “NATO decided that its justification for military
action would be based on the unique combination of a number of
factors that presented itself in Kosovo, without enunciating a new
doctrine or theory.”9 He acknowledged that “[t]his process was not
entirely satisfying to all legal scholars,” but in his view “it did bring the
Alliance to a position that met our common policy objectives without
courting unnecessary trouble for the future.”10
The problem of “courting unnecessary trouble for the future” is
difficult to avoid in a legal system in which norms are shaped by
behavior, as underscored by Jack Goldsmith’s later assessment of “the
precedential value of the Kosovo non-precedent precedent for
Crimea.”11 Regardless of accompanying disclaimers, the rationale
offered for past actions will, predictably, be invoked by other actors in
defense of their own conduct. This does not, however, mean that
precedents are infinitely malleable. When Vladimir Putin cited the
“well-known Kosovo precedent” to justify the annexation of Crimea,12
many observers rejected this as spurious. As with any system of
argumentation and legitimation, the mere ability to advance an
argument does not mean that the argument will be accepted as valid by
other participants in the system.
8. Michael J. Matheson, Justification for the NATO Air Campaign in
Kosovo, 94 ASIL PROC. 301 (2000).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Jack Goldsmith, The Precedential Value of the Kosovo Non-Precedent
Precedent for Crimea, LAWFARE (Mar. 17, 2014); see also Jack Goldsmith, The
Kosovo Precedent for Syria Isn’t Much of a Precedent, LAWFARE (Aug. 24,
2013).
12. Address by President of the Russian Federation (Mar. 18, 2014).
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When the United Nations Security Council declines to exercise its
power to authorize intervention in situations of mass atrocities under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, States that are unwilling to forego the
use of force as a foreign-policy tool must either craft theories of
humanitarian intervention or invoke (and possibly seek to expand)
definitions of permissible acts of self-defense. Some States articulate
ex ante legal rationales, whereas others may let the ex post reactions of
other States (whether in the form of condemnation or acquiescence)
serve as a barometer of the perceived conformity of an act with the
applicable legal framework. Although the constraining function of law
and its accompanying culture of justification are more visible when
actors offer legal rationales explicitly, actors’ sensitivity to the
reactions of other community members also attests to the character of
the international community as one governed by norms and not just
sheer power.
Lawyers, Policymakers, and Public Discourse
The distinction between what countries say and do as a legal
matter, and what they say and do as a matter of policy, carries
significant weight in a system of customary international law built on
evidence of state practice accompanied by opinio juris. Some have
expressed the view that, in the words of former U.K. Foreign Secretary
Jack Straw, “the range of reasonable interpretations [of international
law] is always almost greater than in respect of domestic law.”13 This
overstates the case. In domestic as in international law, however, the
test of an interpretation’s “reasonable[ness]” lies in the reactions of the
relevant interpretive community, which may include a range of
domestic government actors, foreign governments, and international
bodies.
Members of civil society also belong to the interpretive community
of international lawyers.
In the absence of voluntary public
communication or release of legal and policy justifications,
governmental entities may be compelled to make certain documents
public under applicable provisions of national freedom-of-information
acts. There are, however, strict limits on compelled disclosure. For
example, in Corderoy & Ahmed, the U.K. Upper Tribunal upheld the
Information Commissioner’s decision to deny requests for legal advice
given to the Attorney General about a British drone attack in Syria in

13. Letter titled Iraq: Second Resolution from Foreign Secretary Jack
Straw to Attorney General (Feb. 6, 2003).
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2015 that killed two British citizens.14 The event was significant in part
because it was “the first time in modern times that a British asset ha[d]
been used to conduct a strike in a country where [the United Kingdom]
is not involved in a war.”15
The Corderoy court appended to its opinion the April 27, 2016,
Report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights of the House of Lords
and House of Commons, which disavowed any desire “to see the
Governments’ confidential legal advice” while insisting that
“considerations of transparency and democratic accountability require
the Government to explain publicly its understanding of the legal basis
on which it takes action which so seriously affects fundamental
rights.”16 In the Joint Committee’s view:
When dealing with an issue of such grave importance, taking a
life in order to protect lives, the Government should have been
crystal clear about the legal basis for this action from the
outset. They were not. Between the statements of the Prime
Minister, the Permanent Representative to the UN and the
Defence Secretary, they were confused and confusing.17
The Joint Committee’s request for clarification from the
government represents another contribution to international law’s
culture of justification, embedded within the U.K.’s domestic culture of
legal justification and consultation of Parliament.
This and other examples illustrate the continuing relevance, and
limits, of former U.S. State Department Legal Adviser Abram Chayes’s
observation that “the requirement of justification provides an important
substantive check on the legality of action and ultimately on the
responsibility of the decision-making process.”18 On the one hand,
government lawyers must, as a general matter, be able to articulate a
“reasonable” account of a proposed action’s international lawfulness in
order for that action to be considered. On the other hand, as illustrated
by the Chilcot Inquiry into the United Kingdom’s controversial
decision to participate in military action in Iraq in 2003, legal advice is
rarely insulated from perceived policy imperatives, and lawyers will

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Corderoy & Ahmed v. IC, A-G & CO [2017] UKUT 495 (AAC).
Id. at ¶ 12.
Id., Schedule to Decision at ¶ 3.7.
Id. at ¶ 3.18.
ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES
AND THE ROLE OF LAW 42 (1974).
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often (although not invariably) endeavor to accommodate political
decisionmakers’ desired courses of action within available legal
frameworks.19 Public debate about the lawfulness of particular actions,
both within other branches of government and among members of civil
society, can help create pressures for more robust legal justifications
(for example, raising the threshold for what counts as a “reasonable”
interpretation) and impose additional costs on decisionmakers for
taking actions that deviate too widely from accepted norms of behavior.
International law does not, as a general matter, require States to offer
affirmative public justifications for their actions. However, States
routinely offer explanations (and respond to others’ explanations) in
various fora in response to community expectations, and in order more
effectively to influence the evolution of standards of behavior within
the community.
In the end, international law’s culture of justification—comprised
of the exchanges prompted by public interpretations and elucidations of
applicable rules—provides the context within which international legal
actors operate. In the international arena, the farther away an action
falls from the agreed core of legally available options, the more likely it
is to generate international condemnation, and to lead to the imposition
of diplomatic and other costs on the offending actor. In the domestic
sphere, at least in liberal democratic States, the absence of an
acceptable international legal justification provides constituents with a
basis for challenging and scrutinizing governmental actions. As Evan
Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent have observed, “[t]he compulsion of
legality, of course, provides no assurance against an executive
determined to breach its international legal obligations, or (what is
more likely) to interpret them in an unreasonable manner.”20 However,
they continue, “the compulsion of legality is a necessary condition of
constitutional democracy because it embodies the rule of law,”
including the State’s “unwillingness to reject openly the legal basis of
its legal and political authority.”21 While Criddle and Fox-Decent
emphasize the important role of international courts, less formal
mechanisms—such as domestic and supranational committees of
inquiry, diplomatic correspondence, and the “court of public
opinion”—also play a crucial role in setting the expectation that States
will explain their international acts, and that their acts will, by and
large, conform to generally accepted notions of legally justifiable
19. 5 THE REPORT OF THE IRAQ INQUIRY § 5 (July 6, 2016).
20. EVAN J. CRIDDLE & EVAN FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY:
HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY 330 (2016).
21. Id.
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conduct. By speaking the language of international law, States engage
in conversations that help define the terms of, and create the conditions
for, their coexistence.

